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Must the House Always Win?:  
A Critique of Rousso v. State 
Rachel J. Schaefer* 
“[A]ny American with a broadband connection and a checking ac-
count can engage in any form of Internet gambling from any state.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gambling enthusiasts in Washington may be dismayed to learn that 
while it is legal to place a wager at one of the numerous brick-and-mortar 
casinos located in the state,2 placing the same wager over the Internet is a 
crime.3 This result arises from a 2006 amendment to Washington Re-
vised Code 9.46.240 (the Gambling Act), which effectively bans individ-
uals from placing bets or wagers over the Internet from Washington.4 In 
addition to prohibiting bets made by individuals, the law also prohibits 
Internet gambling businesses from receiving bets placed by individuals 
in Washington—even if those gambling businesses operate far from the 
state’s borders.5 
Washington’s Gambling Act is merely one component in a com-
plex—and often contradictory—regulatory scheme on Internet gambling. 
Internet gambling laws operate at both the state and federal levels in 
                                                 
* J.D. Seattle University, 2012; A.B. Mount Holyoke College, 2006. I would like to thank my moth-
er, whose enthusiasm for all forms of gambling is both an inspiration and a concern. I am also grate-
ful for the thoughtful critiques given to me by the members of the Seattle University Law Review, 
including Carrie Hobbs, Ryan Castle, Brian Pinkerton, and Elliot Watson. Hello, Claire. 
 1. Sewell Chan, Congress Rethinks Its Ban on Internet Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/politics/29gamble.html. 
 2. “[W]hile Lee Rousso can walk into any of Washington’s licensed card rooms and lawfully 
compete with other patrons in a game of poker, if he turns on his computer and plays the same game 
over the Internet, he commits a felony under the Gambling Act and can be imprisoned for five 
years.” Brief for the Poker Players Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Lee H. Rousso at 2, 
Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 83040-1), 2010 WL 2206096. 
 3. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240 (criminalizing Internet gambling); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.20.021 (defining the punishment associated with Internet gambling). 
 4. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240. 
 5. See id. 
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what is best described as a “regulatory and enforcement quagmire.”6 At 
the locus of this regulatory scheme are two federal laws that purport to 
ban Internet gambling businesses from operating in the United States by 
criminalizing the interstate transmissions of bets and wagers.7 Both fed-
eral laws, however, recognize the authority of states to pass laws on the 
subject of gambling.8 Against this backdrop, some states, like Washing-
ton, prohibit Internet gambling.9 
But not all states agree that online gambling should be banned. 
Some states, perhaps looking to increase tax revenues and close budget 
deficits, have recently considered legalizing the activity. In 2011 alone, 
lawmakers in Iowa, California, Florida, and New Jersey introduced bills 
to legalize certain forms of online gambling.10 Given the alluring pro-
spect of Internet gambling operations to be a source for local jobs and 
revenue, other states may soon follow with similar proposals.11 Should 
these proposals become law, it is possible that some states may permit 
individuals to place bets over the Internet, while other states forbid such 
activity—a result that may have inconsistent consequences in light of the 
“borderless” nature of the Internet. 
In addition to the potential for inconsistencies within this regulatory 
quagmire, state Internet gambling regulations raise constitutional ques-
tions that invoke federalism12 concerns. Whereas Internet gambling is of 
federal purview because the funds wagered pass over state lines,13 regu-
lation of gambling has traditionally been an exercise of state police pow-
                                                 
 6. Chan, supra note 1. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See Charles P. Ciaccio, Jr., Internet Gambling: Recent Developments and State of the Law, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532–47 (2010). 
 9. At least eight states have made Internet gambling illegal. See Jonathan Conon, Comment, 
Aces and Eights: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Resides in “Dead Man’s” 
Land in Attempting to Further Curb Online Gambling and Why Expanded Criminalization is Prefer-
able to Legalization, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1173 (2009). 
 10. Alexandra Berzon, States Make Play for Web Gambling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703409904576174730883294102.html?KEYWOR
DS=internet+gambling. In 2001, Nevada considered legalizing all forms of Internet gambling in a 
law that would allow for “interactive gaming.” Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 548. But the state dropped 
this proposal after the Department of Justice announced that it considered all interstate Internet gam-
bling illegal under the Wire Act. Id. In 2011, the state renewed its attempt to become the center of 
the gambling industry when it proposed regulations that would permit certain forms of intrastate 
online gambling. Alexandra Berzon, Nevada Sets Framework for Internet Poker, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577115182815513366.html. 
 11. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ch. 1, at 6 (June 18, 1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html. 
 12. Federalism is defined as “the legal relationship and distribution of power between the na-
tional and regional governments within a federal system of government.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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er within an individual state’s borders.14  Before the Washington State 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Rousso v. State, it was uncertain 
whether a state such as Washington could regulate Internet gambling 
without running afoul of federal constitutional authority. Yet in Rousso, 
the supreme court affirmed the state’s authority to regulate Internet gam-
bling.15 Ultimately, the court upheld the law under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, determining that the Gambling Act did not impermissibly 
interfere with the federal government’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.16 
As the first decision addressing the constitutionality of a state Inter-
net gambling law,17 the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rousso is significant. In light of recent state proposals to legalize Internet 
gambling, Rousso will likely become persuasive precedent as other 
courts struggle to determine whether other state Internet gambling laws 
will share a similar fate. However, the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Rousso may leave these states with more questions 
than answers. Specifically, the court’s conclusory and incomplete reason-
ing provides little guidance for how future courts may assess the consti-
tutionality of state Internet gambling laws. 
This Note critiques the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rousso and proposes that future courts should adopt the reasoning ar-
ticulated by the Washington Court of Appeals when assessing the consti-
tutionality of state Internet gambling laws. To that end, this Note pro-
ceeds in five Parts. Part II explains the social concerns associated with 
Internet gambling and outlines the federal and state laws that seek to ad-
dress those concerns. Part III outlines the origin, principles, and legal 
standard of the dormant Commerce Clause, the doctrine used by Wash-
ington courts to assess the constitutionality of the state’s Internet gam-
bling ban. Part IV then discusses the legal challenge in Rousso, begin-
ning with a background of the case and concluding with the court’s ap-
plication of the dormant Commerce Clause. In particular, this Part argues 
that although the court reached the correct conclusion, its analysis was 
unfaithful to precedent and incomplete. Part V argues that future courts 
should adopt the reasoning applied by the Washington State Court of 
Appeals when assessing the constitutionality of state Internet gambling 
regulations. Part VI concludes. 
                                                 
 14. Conon, supra note 9, at 1164. 
 15. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1095 (Wash. 2010). 
 16. Id. 
 17. A Westlaw search yields no results for cases other than Rousso that address the constitu-
tionality of a state’s Internet gambling law. 
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II. AN UNCERTAIN REGULATORY SCHEME 
Internet gambling raises a host of social concerns that both federal 
and state laws have sought to address. This Part first identifies these con-
cerns and then explains how current legislation operates to address these 
concerns. In particular, section B provides an overview of two federal 
statutes on the subject of Internet gambling, while section C provides an 
overview of Washington’s Gambling Act. 
A. Social Concerns Associated with Internet Gambling 
The Internet gambling industry is estimated to bring in over $24 
billion a year.18 Fueling the success of this industry is the fact that gam-
bling online is simply easier than in traditional “brick-and-mortar” casi-
nos.19 Instead of having to travel to a casino or lottery outlet to place a 
bet, individuals can simply gamble while sitting at a home computer.20 
Placing bets online allows individuals to avoid not only the inconven-
ience and other costs of traveling to a gambling venue, but also the repu-
tational harm sometimes associated with gambling in a public place.21 
And while roughly 86% of Americans have gambled or will gamble at 
some point in their lives,22 this figure may soon increase as individuals 
are able to gamble “in every home and every bedroom and every dorm 
room, and on every iPhone, every BlackBerry, every laptop.”23 
For lawmakers, the popularity of Internet gambling, coupled with 
technological advancements, raise regulatory concerns in three particular 
areas. First, children are susceptible targets of Internet gambling opera-
tions.24 Children are particularly captive audiences who spend considera-
ble amounts of time on the Internet, often sitting unsupervised in front of 
computer screens.25 Exacerbating this unsupervised access is the fact that 
most gambling websites rely on a user to truthfully disclose his or her 
correct age prior to gambling, often making little or no attempt to verify 
the accuracy of the information before permitting the user to gamble.26 
Because Internet gambling websites can be used anonymously, these un-
                                                 
 18. Anthony S. Broadman, Washington State Outbids Betcha.com, 14 GAMING L. REV. & 
ECON 685, 687 (2010). 
 19. Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet Regulation, 
32 INT’L LAW. 1115, 1116 (1998). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 1, at 1. 
 23. Chan, supra note 1. 
 24. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 4. 
 25. Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 637 (2011). 
 26. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 4. 
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derage users may access—and potentially abuse—gambling websites 
even if such websites request age verification.27 
Second, compulsive gamblers are particularly vulnerable to the al-
lure of Internet gambling.28 Internet games are available twenty-four 
hours a day and offer instant gratification to individuals in the privacy of 
their homes.29 This instant gratification, coupled with the ease with which 
gambling information can be transmitted over the Internet, may “magnify 
the potential destructiveness” of existing gambling addictions.30 
Lastly, the lack of accountability and transparency associated with 
Internet gambling may result in criminal abuse of online gambling opera-
tions. As one user describes, the absence of face-to-face interaction re-
duces the legitimacy of gambling online: 
Not only are you not looking at your opponents, you’re not looking 
at the cards being dealt, you’re not looking at who’s dealing them to 
you. So, you don’t know if the whole thing is legitimate, even if all 
the players sitting with you are just as legitimate as you are. Maybe 
the whole game isn’t.31 
Because Internet gambling businesses currently operate out of foreign 
jurisdictions, these businesses could quickly alter, move, or entirely re-
move sites without users catching on.32 The ease of mobility and lack of 
transparency associated with foreign Internet gambling operations thus 
makes it possible for dishonest operators to take users’ money and 
promptly close down without ever paying winnings.33 
B. The Federal Response to Internet Gambling 
In light of these social hazards, at least two federal statutes have 
sought to prevent the interstate transmission of online gambling infor-
mation: the Wire Act and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act (UIGEA).34 Both statutes, however, are vague and attempt to regu-
                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. ch. 5, at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 2380 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bernard P. Horn, 
Director of Political Affairs of the National Coalition Against Gambling Expansion)). 
 31. How Online Gamblers Unmasked Cheaters, CBS NEWS, (June 28, 2009, 9:27 PM), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/25/60minutes/main4633254.shtml. 
 32. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 5. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s 
Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH L. REV. 41, 45 (2010). The Travel Act and the Illegal Gam-
bling Business Act also touch on the subject of gambling. See id. Because the applicability of these 
statutes to state Internet gambling laws was not addressed by the Washington courts in Rousso, they 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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late Internet gambling only indirectly; neither operates as an outright ban 
of Internet gambling. 
1. The Wire Act 
The Wire Act of 1961 (the Wire Act) was one of the first federal 
statutes used to question the legality of Internet gambling.35 Although the 
Wire Act does not explicitly target gambling over the Internet, the statute 
makes it a federal crime to knowingly use wire communications to place 
bets or wagers through interstate or foreign commerce.36  The relevant 
portion of the Wire Act provides: 
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering 
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission 
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information 
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or 
contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which enti-
tles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or 
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.37 
The statute also contains a rule of construction that exempts the trans-
mission of a bet or wager between two or more states that each permit 
gambling,38 which implicitly acknowledges the authority of the states to 
regulate gambling within their borders. 
Although the Wire Act was passed long before the advent of the In-
ternet,39 many scholars believe that the statute’s reference to “a wire 
communication facility” is sufficiently broad such that the statute could 
also be read as prohibiting Internet gambling activities.40 Notably, the 
                                                 
 35. Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal Government’s Approach to Inter-
net Gambling, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 161, 167 (2009). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). 
 37. Id. “The purpose of [the Wire Act] is to assist the various States and the District of Colum-
bia in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to 
aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use of wire communication 
facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of bets or wagers and gambling information 
in interstate and foreign commerce.” H.R. Rep. No. 967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2631. 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent . . . the trans-
mission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from 
a State . . . where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State . . . in which such 
betting is legal.”). 
 39. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 40. See Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 532–33. Notwithstanding this view, there are at least three 
other interpretations to the Wire Act, including that the statute (1) prohibits all Internet betting; (2) 
prohibits only Internet sports betting; or (3) prohibits only Internet sports gambling that is not sanc-
tioned by the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978. Id. at 541. 
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Department of Justice took the position that the Wire Act’s reach extend-
ed to all forms of gambling.41 Yet the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
within the Department of Justice recently cast doubt on such an interpre-
tation when it concluded in an advisory opinion that the Wire Act ex-
tends only to the transmission of bets or wagers on a sporting event or 
contest.42 Thus, at least according to the OLC, the Wire Act does not 
prohibit any online gambling activity that is not a sporting event or con-
test.43 Because the OLC’s opinion is merely advisory,44 it is unclear 
whether courts will accept this interpretation. 
2. The UIGEA 
The UIGEA45 is the most recent federal statute to regulate the inter-
state transfer of funds used for gambling purposes. Enacted in 2006, the 
UIGEA extends the reach of the Wire Act and specifically addresses the 
subject of Internet gambling.46  Under the UIGEA,  
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may 
knowingly accept, in connection with the participation of another 
person in unlawful Internet gambling—(1) credit, or the proceeds of 
credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (including 
credit extended through the use of a credit card); (2) an electronic 
fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmit-
                                                 
 41. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to 
Use the Internet and Out-Of-State Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults 
Violate the Wire Act, 35 OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 1, 1 (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 3. The OLC refrained from answering whether such a ruling would conflict with the 
UIGEA, although that issue was brought to its attention. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4. The OLC read the relevant portion of the Wire Act as consisting of two broad 
clauses. Under the first clause, anyone engaged in the business of betting or wagering is barred from 
knowingly using a wire communication facility “for the transmission in interstate or foreign com-
merce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting 
event or contest.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). “The second [clause] bars any such person from 
knowingly using a wire communication facility to transmit communications that entitle the recipient 
to ‘receive money or credit’ either ‘as a result of bets or wagers’ or ‘for information assisting in the 
placing of bets or wagers.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). Notably, the phrase “on any sporting 
event or contest” appears in the first clause, but not the second. Id. Despite the absence of this phrase 
in the second part of the statute, the OLC opined that in light of the statute’s text and legislative 
history, the phrase “bets or wagers” in the second clause was best read as a reference to the phrase 
“bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest” in the first clause. See id. at 5–12. 
 44. The OLC’s opinions are, however, generally considered binding on the Executive Branch. 
Joseph Marchesano, Note, Where Lawfare Meets Lawsuit in the Case of Padilla v. Yoo, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1575, 1583 (2011). 
 45. 31 U.S.C § 5361–67.  
 46. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 542. Several years after gambling first appeared on the Internet, 
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommended that Congress pass legislation that 
would prohibit wire transfers either to Internet gambling websites or from the banks that represent 
such websites. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(2). 
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ting business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or mon-
ey transmitting service, from or on behalf of such other person; (3) 
any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on be-
half of such other person and is drawn on or payable at or through 
any financial institution; or (4) the proceeds of any other form of fi-
nancial transaction . . . which involves a financial institution as a 
payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or for the benefit of 
such other person.47 
Although it criminalizes the processing or receipt of funds used in Inter-
net gambling, the UIGEA does not altogether ban online gambling.48 In-
stead, by targeting the transfer of funds used for gambling purposes, the 
UIGEA indirectly prohibits Internet gambling businesses from operating 
in the United States.49 
Despite its name, the UIGEA does little to clarify what types of In-
ternet gambling are “unlawful gambling operations.”50 The statute does 
not define what activities constitute “unlawful internet gambling,” leav-
ing that determination to existing federal and state law.51 Moreover, the 
statute only targets funds that flow to Internet gambling operators; it does 
not apply to the individuals who place bets online.52 
The UIGEA does not explicitly preempt state laws that regulate In-
ternet gambling. Instead, the statute contains a rule of construction ac-
knowledging that states may regulate Internet gambling within their bor-
ders: “No provision [of the UIGEA] shall be construed as altering, limit-
ing, or extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact pro-
hibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.”53 
Thus, the UIGEA, like the Wire Act, envisions that states will continue 
to regulate gambling to some degree.54 
C. Washington’s Internet Gambling Ban 
Washington responded to the social harms associated with Internet 
gambling in 2006 when the state legislature proposed an amendment to 
                                                 
 47. 31 U.S.C. § 5363. 
 48. King, supra note 34, at 45. 
 49. Grahmann, supra note 35, at 1. 
 50. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 542. 
 51. Id.. The statute defines “unlawful internet gambling” as “plac[ing], receiv[ing], or other-
wise knowingly transmit[ting] a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part, 
of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the 
State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.” 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5362(10)(a). 
 52. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 543. 
 53. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b). 
 54. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
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the state’s Gambling Act of 1973.55 The purpose of the amendment was 
to “reaffirm[] and clarify[] the prohibition against internet and certain 
other interactive electronic or mechanical devices to engage in gam-
bling.”56 Testimony on the bill urged that the bill was needed to reaffirm 
the state’s policy “prohibiting gambling that exploits . . . new technolo-
gies.”57 The amendment received overwhelming support from the legisla-
ture, passing by a vote of forty-four to three.58 
In its current form, the Gambling Act is a sweeping prohibition 
against all aspects of online gambling. The Act provides, “Whoever 
knowingly transmits or receives gambling information by . . . the inter-
net, a telecommunications transmission system, or similar means, or 
knowingly installs or maintains equipment for the transmission or receipt 
of gambling information shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .”59 Thus, 
not only is it illegal for Washington residents to gamble online, but it is 
also illegal to operate an Internet gambling website; to install or maintain 
equipment to send or receive gambling information; and to facilitate In-
ternet gambling in any way.60 
The Act criminalizes the transmission of “gambling information,” a 
phrase that encompasses “any wager made in the course of and any in-
formation intended to be used for professional gambling.”61 Under this 
                                                 
 55. S.B. 6613, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). 
 56. Id. The senate’s recommendation to modify the Gambling Act arose partly out of its con-
cern that the judiciary might find that the state’s existing gambling laws permitted certain forms of 
online gambling. Id. The state was a defendant to a case where it was argued that the state’s existing 
gambling laws empowered the Washington Lottery Commission to authorize electronic gambling 
devices. Id. 
 57. Id. In addition to this concern, the legislature also stated that prohibiting all forms of Inter-
net gambling was necessary to support the state’s policy against lawsuits and other legal challenges. 
Id. Specifically, the legislature feared challenges brought under various international trade agree-
ments; challenges in enforcement actions prosecuted in cooperation with federal law enforcement 
agencies; and challenges in negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240. 
 60. WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, GC5-228, ILLEGAL INTERNET GAMBLING 1 (Oct. 
2011), www.wsgc.wa.gov/newsletters/5-228.pdf. 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0245. A person is defined as engaging in professional gambling 
when: 
 (a) Acting other than as a player or in the manner authorized by this chapter, the 
person knowingly engages in conduct which materially aids any form of gambling activi-
ty; or 
 (b) Acting other than in a manner authorized by this chapter, the person pays a fee 
to participate in a card game, contest of chance, lottery, or other gambling activity; or 
 (c) Acting other than as a player or in the manner authorized by this chapter, the 
person knowingly accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement 
or understanding with any other person whereby he or she participates or is to participate 
in the proceeds of gambling activity; or 
 (d) The person engages in bookmaking; or 
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expansive definition, any wager placed over the Internet from Washing-
ton—whether for a penny or for several hundred dollars—could subject a 
user to criminal penalties.62 In addition, because the Act criminalizes the 
“receipt” of gambling information, the law could apply to any Internet 
gambling operator that receives a bet from an individual located in 
Washington,63 even if that business operates far outside the state’s bor-
ders.64 
The Gambling Act is striking not only because of its scope, but also 
because of the severity of the punishment associated with violations. Vi-
olations of the Act range from a misdemeanor to a felony,65 and persons 
convicted of Internet gambling in Washington may face a maximum 
penalty of five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both.66 Some have 
characterized this punishment as particularly harsh: “[In] Washington[] 
. . . Internet gambling is a class C felony, the same as third-degree 
rape.”67 Others have characterized the law as hypocritically excessive: 
“Martians might have a difficult time understanding that if you play pok-
er online for money in the state of Washington, you’re committing a 
class C felony.”68 
Notwithstanding the myriad of reasons the legislature may have had 
to ban Internet gambling in Washington, the state’s law enforcement 
nonetheless may face significant hurdles in its efforts to curb or eliminate 
the activity.69 Most Internet gambling businesses operate in foreign juris-
dictions under licenses granted by those jurisdictions,70 making it chal-
                                                                                                             
 (e) The person conducts a lottery; or 
 (f) The person violates [Wash. Rev. Code] § 9.46.039. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0269. Furthermore, in Washington, funds do not need to be wagered for a 
‘bet’ to be placed; the mere opportunity to gamble may fall within this definition. See Internet Cmty 
& Entm’t Corp. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, 238 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Wash. 2010). 
 62. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 
83040-1), 2009 WL 6083567. 
 63. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240. 
 64. Whether the state could prosecute an out-of-state actor for such a violation raises a jurisdic-
tional question that is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 65. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021. 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021. 
 67. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 549. 
 68. Michael Hiltzik, Calling America’s Bluff on Internet Gambling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/19/business/fi-hiltzik19 (quoting Joseph M. Kelly). 
 69. In Washington, enforcement of the Gambling Act is focused on “larger, higher level inter-
net gambling activities,” which includes the operation of gambling websites and service providers. 
WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, GC5-165, ILLEGAL INTERNET GAMBLING 2 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/newsletters/internet_gambling_brochure.pdf. Although the state does not 
currently have an active campaign against individuals who gamble online in the state, the state does 
warn that such players run the risk of prosecution. Id. 
 70. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 2, at 16. 
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lenging—if not impossible—for state law enforcement officials to effec-
tively prosecute violations of the Act.71 
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A NUCLEAR BOMB OF STATE 
INTERNET REGULATIONS 
In Rousso, the Washington State Supreme Court noted that, alt-
hough neither the Wire Act nor the UIGEA purports to preempt state 
Internet gambling laws, this does not mean that Washington can regulate 
Internet gambling with impunity.72 Accordingly, both the Washington 
Court of Appeals and the Washington State Supreme Court applied the 
dormant Commerce Clause to assess whether the Gambling Act imper-
missibly interfered with the federal government’s constitutional authority 
over interstate commerce.73 
This Part provides an overview of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
beginning with the origins of the Clause, along with the legal standard 
that courts apply. It then discusses how courts have applied the dormant 
Commerce Clause with regard to state regulations affecting the Internet. 
A. Origin and Policies Behind The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Despite its name, the dormant Commerce Clause does not appear in 
the Constitution; instead, it is a negative inference drawn by the Supreme 
Court in recognition of powers granted to the federal government under 
Article I of the United States Constitution.74 Article I grants the federal 
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”75 Although 
this language speaks in terms of a positive grant of power to the federal 
government, the Supreme Court has long recognized that this positive 
grant of authority also implies a limitation on the power of the states to 
                                                 
 71. Id. Notably, some state officials have sought to address these enforcement difficulties by 
calling for a national response to online gambling. See id. In its plea for a federal response to Internet 
gambling, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) noted that state laws on Internet 
gambling are frustratingly ineffective. Id. Citing “[t]he jurisdictional uniqueness of the Internet,” the 
NAAG called on Congress to enact a national response to Internet gambling activities that evade 
state regulations. Id. 
 72. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Wash. 2010). 
 73. See infra Part IV. 
 74. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Founding Fathers also recognized the need to “restrain[] 
by national control . . . injurious impediments to the intercourse [among the States].” THE 
FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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erect barriers against interstate trade.76 It is from this negative implica-
tion that the dormant Commerce Clause arose. 
The dormant Commerce Clause is thus a judge-made doctrine77 
aimed at prohibiting “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”78 
Hailed as “essential to the foundations of the Union,”79 the dormant 
Commerce Clause serves as a bulwark against state laws that interfere 
with or impede a strong national economy.80 To that end, the doctrine 
reflects the policies that one state should not foreclose others from access 
to its market; that states may not enact laws to give themselves competi-
tive advantages; and that states should not rival one another for favored 
status of citizens.81 
While originalists may scoff at the existence of a doctrine not found 
in the Constitution,82 two justifications underlie the existence and appli-
cation of the dormant Commerce Clause. First, the doctrine ensures eco-
nomic efficiency of a national market.83 By analyzing whether state regu-
lations cast economic burdens on out-of-state businesses, the judiciary’s 
recognition of the dormant Commerce Clause is a means of protecting 
unrestricted trade among the states and securing the economic benefits of 
a free market.84 Second, the doctrine preserves the representative process 
of law making.85 By analyzing the effect a state law has on out-of-state 
businesses, the judiciary’s application of the doctrine is a means of en-
suring that out-of-state actors do not bear the costs of a law that passed 
without the votes of their representative legislatures.86 
                                                 
 76. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326 (“The Commerce Clause has . . . been interpreted by th[e] Court 
not only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting 
federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation.”). 
 77. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 
YALE L.J. 785, 786 (2001). 
 78. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause reflects a central concern of the Fram-
ers, which was that in order to succeed, the Union would have to avoid tendencies toward “economic 
Balkinzation”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Justice Scalia, for example, has criticized the dormant Commerce Clause as requiring an 
inquiry into “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 83. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 790. 
 84. Id. at 788. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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B. The Legal Standard 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, a statute may be invalidated 
if it discriminates against interstate commerce, and courts look for two 
types of discrimination: express discrimination and implicit discrimina-
tion.87 
To determine whether a state regulation withstands scrutiny under 
the dormant Commerce Clause, a court first scrutinizes the language of 
the challenged law. In doing so, the court looks to see whether the lan-
guage of the challenged law draws distinctions between in-state and out-
of-state economic interests.88 If the state law discriminates against out-
of-state businesses in favor of local interests, it will be subjected to “the 
strictest scrutiny” to determine whether there is a legitimate local pur-
pose and an absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.89 
If the language of the state law is nondiscriminatory, a court exam-
ines whether the law nonetheless “impinges on interstate commerce”90 in 
its practical effect. To determine if the effect of a state law is to discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce, a court must weigh the state’s interests 
in passing the law against the burdens the law imposes on interstate 
commerce.91 If a state statute regulates “even-handedly” to promote a 
legitimate state interest and affects interstate commerce only incidental-
ly, it is upheld.92 However, if the statute imposes burdens on interstate 
commerce that are clearly excessive in relation to the state benefits, a 
court will examine whether the state’s objective could have been accom-
plished in a less burdensome manner.93 If the state has a legitimate pur-
pose in the regulation, then the extent of the burden on interstate com-
merce that a court will tolerate depends on both the nature of the state 
interest and whether that interest could be promoted equally by less re-
strictive means.94 
In analyzing the burdens that a state law imposes on interstate 
commerce, a court is not limited to considering the financial costs im-
posed on out-of-state actors. Goldsmith and Sykes, two leading scholars 
on state Internet regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause, have 
also opined that the Clause prohibits conduct that (1) creates inconsisten-
                                                 
 87. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (explaining that courts must inquire 
whether a state statute discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical 
effect). 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 337. 
 90. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 788. 
 91. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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cies among the states and (2) regulates conduct occurring wholly outside 
of the state.95 The scholars’ arguments are rooted firmly in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. For example, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics 
Corporation of America, the Court held that the Clause also prohibited 
state regulations that “adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting 
activities to inconsistent regulations.”96 This maxim does not mandate 
uniformity among state laws,97 but instead looks to whether the incon-
sistencies between state laws create compliance costs that are clearly ex-
cessive in relation to local benefits.98 In addition, in Healy v. Beer Insti-
tute, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law that had the ef-
fect of limiting the ability of out-of-state beer shippers to alter their pric-
es outside of Connecticut.99 The “critical inquiry,” the Court held, was 
“whether the practical effect of the regulation [was] to control conduct 
beyond the boundaries of the State.”100 
C. The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
When applied to state Internet regulations, the scope of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is not always clear. This uncertainty has led critics to 
deem the doctrine a “nuclear bomb of a legal theory” of state Internet 
regulations.101 
That metaphor is an apt description of early judicial decisions on 
Internet regulations. For example, in American Libraries Association v. 
Pataki,102 one of the most controversial cases on state Internet regula-
tions, a district court enjoined enforcement of a New York statute that 
prohibited the transmission of pornographic communications over the 
Internet.103 In doing so, the court reasoned that because the Internet had 
no jurisdictional boundaries, New York’s law might subject an actor to 
“haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulations” 
by states.104 According to the court, “[t]he nature of the Internet ma[de] it 
impossible to restrict the effects” of the Internet regulation that fall out-
side the regulating state.105 Exacerbating this concern was the fact that 
                                                 
 95. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 789. 
 96. 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987). 
 97. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 790. 
 98. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 411 (Wash. 2001) (adopting the analysis of Goldsmith and 
Sykes and recognizing that the inconsistent regulations and extraterritoriality inquiries are proper 
facets of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 99. 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787. 
 102. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 103. Id. at 178–79. 
 104. Id. at 168. 
 105. Id. at 177. 
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information transmitted over the Internet appeared simultaneously in 
every state: “Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available 
to all other Internet users worldwide.”106 
American Libraries thus stands for the extreme proposition that 
states simply may not pass laws affecting the Internet. Under the ap-
proach in American Libraries, “the Commerce Clause precludes a state 
from enacting legislation that has the practical effect of exporting that 
state’s domestic policies.”107 This bright-line rule prohibits any state law 
concerning economic activity conducted over the Internet because, under 
the court’s line of reasoning, Internet service providers could send con-
tent into every state, and state governments could not stop the flow of 
this content at the borders.108 Like the Internet itself, the reach of the 
court’s logic has no boundaries: any state law affecting the Internet 
would likely be unconstitutional. 
While some jurisdictions have followed the American Libraries ap-
proach regarding state regulation of the Internet,109 the view is not with-
out criticism. Some scholars maintain that American Libraries represents 
“an impoverished understanding” of the Internet, misreads dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and misunderstands the economics of 
state regulation of transborder transactions.110 Despite these criticisms, 
the reasoning in American Libraries continues to be invoked by those 
who argue that state regulations of the Internet have effects beyond a 
state’s borders, create inconsistent obligations, and impose burdens on 
interstate commerce that outweigh their local benefits.111 
Yet the bright-line rule of American Libraries view has largely giv-
en way towards a more balanced approach. As the Washington courts’ 
analyses in Rousso demonstrates, the dormant Commerce Clause pro-
vides an appropriate vehicle for assessing whether state Internet gam-
bling laws impose impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. 
                                                 
 106. Id. at 167 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 
844 (1997)). 
 107. Id. at 174. 
 108. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 785. 
 109. See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2004); Am. 
Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 
1161–62 (10th Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Comm’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751–52 (E.D. 
Mich. 1999), aff’d and remanded, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 110. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787; see also Laura Vanderstappen, Note, Internet 
Pharmacies and the Specter of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 619 
(2006); Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, Recent Development—The Dormant Commerce 
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(2003). 
 111. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787. 
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IV. ROUSSO V. STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO 
WASHINGTON’S INTERNET GAMBLING BAN 
This Part begins with an overview of Rousso’s factual and proce-
dural background. It then discusses in turn how the Washington Court of 
Appeals and the Washington State Supreme Court applied a dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis to Rousso’s constitutional challenge. 
A. Case Background and Procedural History 
Lee Rousso, a poker enthusiast, began his gambling career in 2003 
after learning of the rags-to-riches story of Chris Moneymaker, a World 
Series of Poker Champion.112  From 2003 until 2006, Rousso participated 
in poker games with people around the world through the website 
pokerstars.com.113 While on the website, Rousso played in “ring” or 
“cash” games where the chips on the virtual table represented actual 
money.114 Rousso deemed himself a “skilled amateur” who managed to 
win a qualifying tournament for the 2005 World Series of Poker.115 
Yet Rousso’s aspirations of a World Series of Poker Title were 
short-lived. After July 6, 2007, the effective date of Washington’s Inter-
net gambling ban, Rousso committed a criminal act of professional gam-
bling each time he paid fees to play poker online.116  Thus, on the open-
ing day of the 2007 World Series of Poker Main Event, Rousso filed an 
action in King County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that Wash-
ington’s ban on Internet gambling was unconstitutional.117 Rousso based 
his claim on two theories: that the Gambling Act was a mere protection-
ist measure designed to discriminate against otherwise legal out-of-state 
businesses and in favor of Washington businesses; and that the Gambling 
Act interfered with Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and inter-
national commerce.118 
The trial court denied Rousso’s request for relief,119 and Rousso ap-
pealed. On appeal, Rousso argued that the lower court “failed to recog-
                                                 
 112. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 83040-
1), 2009 WL 6083567. In 2003, Chris Moneymaker defeated 839 players in the World Series of 
Poker Main Event and won $2,500,000. Moneymaker qualified for the Event by playing poker over 
the Internet. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Complaint at 1–5, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 07-2-22438-6 
KNT), 2007 WL 5754725 at *1–5. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Granting Defendant’s 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 07-2-
22438-6 KNT), 2008 WL 4690005. 
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nize the State’s hypocrisy with respect to gambling . . . or chose to re-
ward it.”120 
B. The Decision of the Washington Court of Appeals 
Rousso’s request for relief fared no better with the Washington 
Court of Appeals. First, after determining that the dormant Commerce 
Clause provided the appropriate standard with which to review the 
claim,121 the court quickly disposed of the argument that the language of 
the Gambling Act discriminated against interstate commerce.122 As the 
court correctly noted, the language of the Act applied equally to in-state 
and out-of-state actors and businesses.123 
Second, the court addressed Rousso’s argument that the effect of 
the Act was to discriminate against interstate commerce by restricting 
Washington poker players to gamble in state.124 According to Rousso, the 
purpose of the state’s ban on Internet gambling was mere economic pro-
tectionism.125 To illustrate this alleged economic protectionism, Rousso 
pointed out that the volume of legal gambling in Washington increased 
from $33.5 million to $1,695.3 million within a thirty-year period, “a 
staggering fifty-fold increase in legal gambling!”126 These figures, 
Rousso claimed, showed that the state had a significant economic interest 
in protecting its brick-and-mortar gambling operations.127 Thus, he ar-
gued, when “[st]ripped of legislative pretensions,” these figures demon-
strated that “prosecutions under the Gambling Act [did] not serve the 
purpose of policing public morals, but, instead, punished encroachments 
on the State’s monopoly.”128 
The court disagreed with Rousso’s characterization of the Gam-
bling Act’s effects. First, the court examined Washington’s long history 
of regulating gambling, as well as its legitimate need to regulate an activ-
                                                 
 120. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 12, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 
84040-1), 2009 WL 6083567. The “hypocrisy” Rousso referred to was the fact that Washington law 
permitted him to play poker in a licensed card room, but not online. Brief for the Poker Players 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Lee H. Rousso at 1, Rousso, 239 P.3d 1084 (No. 83040-1), 
2010 WL 2206096. 
 121. The court concluded that the dormant Commerce Clause applied because, although vari-
ous federal laws affect Internet gambling, none of those laws expressly authorized otherwise uncon-
stitutional state laws regulating Internet gambling. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 246 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11-12, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 
84040-1), 2009 WL 6083567. 
 125. See id. at 11. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 11–12. 
 128. Id. at 11. 
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ity that fell into “the category of social and economic evils.”129 A review 
of the history of Washington’s gambling laws demonstrated that the state 
had a longstanding and legitimate interest in controlling gambling.130 
That interest was a “pure exercise of the traditional police power,” and it 
was justified by the state’s desire to safeguard its citizens both from the 
harms of gambling itself and from professional gambling’s “historically 
close relationship with organized crime.”131 These long-standing and le-
gitimate interests in controlling gambling made it doubtful that the state 
could effectively address the harms associated with Internet gambling 
without directly regulating the transmission of gambling information.132 
Having found that the state had a legitimate interest in regulating 
online gambling, the court then addressed the burdens imposed by the 
Gambling Act. The court recognized that the Gambling Act was prob-
lematic in at least one regard: the Gambling Act purported to impose 
criminal liability on Internet gambling businesses that were not located in 
Washington and on businesses that did not actively solicit wagers from 
Washington residents.133 Accordingly, the Gambling Act implicated the 
dual Commerce Clause prohibitions against legislation that creates in-
consistencies among the states and regulates conduct occurring wholly 
outside of Washington.134 The court noted that this standard was estab-
lished by the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Heckel, a case 
in which the court expressly adopted Goldsmith and Sykes’ inconsistent 
regulations and extraterritoriality tests for purposes of state Internet regu-
lations.135 
Despite recognizing that the Act implicated the potential to create 
inconsistencies among the states, the court focused its analysis on how 
the Act regulated conduct occurring outside the state.136 Specifically, the 
court recognized that the Gambling Act’s criminal penalties could apply 
to a passive website like pokerstars.com, a business that operates far be-
yond Washington’s borders.137 Nonetheless, the court found solace in the 
fact that an Internet business such as pokerstars.com could easily deter-
                                                 
 129. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
 
 130. Id. at 251. The court noted that from its inception, the state had considered gambling to be 
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 131. Id. at 251. 
 132. Id. Specifically, the court questioned whether the state would be able to regulate Internet 
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 133. Id. at 251–52. 
 134. Id. at 252. 
 135. Id. (citing State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001)). 
 136. Id. at 252–53 
 137. Id. at 253. 
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mine a user’s geographical location based on the Internet protocol (IP) 
address of his or her computer.138 To the court, the criminal penalties 
associated with violations of the Gambling Act were assuaged by the fact 
that technology made compliance with the Act relatively simple.139 
At its core, the court reasoned, Rousso’s constitutional claim was 
based on the notion that the borderless nature of the Internet rendered 
unconstitutional any state law that attempted to regulate it.140 This argu-
ment reflected a “simplistic understanding” of the Internet’s architec-
ture.141 Drawing heavily from Goldsmith and Sykes, the court character-
ized as “overbroad” all formulations of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine that precluded state Internet regulations.142 In doing so, the court 
rejected the American Libraries view of state Internet regulations.143 The 
proper test for state regulations of the Internet, the court concluded, was 
the dormant Commerce Clause approach: a balancing test that looked to 
whether regulation imposed burdens on commerce that were “clearly 
excessive.”144 
Applying this balancing test, the court determined that Washing-
ton’s Gambling Act withstood Rousso’s constitutional challenge. The 
court concluded: “[G]iven the importance of the State’s interests in pro-
tecting its citizens from the ills associated with gambling, and the rela-
tively small cost imposed on out-of-state businesses by complying with 
the Gambling Act, Rousso has failed to meet his burden of showing that 
the Gambling Act is ‘clearly excessive.’”145 
C. The Washington State Supreme Court’s Decision 
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the con-
stitutionality of Washington’s Internet gambling ban.146 The court’s rea-
soning, however, differed slightly from that of the court of appeals. 
As a threshold matter, the court determined that the dormant Com-
merce Clause applied.147 It reasoned that although the Wire Act and 
UIGEA also regulated interstate Internet gambling, neither statute dele-
                                                 
 138. Id. For a compelling argument regarding how geolocation technologies—which make it 
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gated to the states the express authority to do so.148 Furthermore, alt-
hough these federal statutes recognized the authority of the states to 
regulate Internet gambling within their borders, neither permitted the 
states to do so with impunity.149 
Accordingly, the court then analyzed whether the Gambling Act 
discriminated against interstate commerce either in its language or in its 
effect. Like the court of appeals, the supreme court concluded that the 
language of the Act was not discriminatory.150 The Act, the court rea-
soned, prohibited Internet gambling equally, drawing no distinctions with 
regard to where the gambling occurred.151 
Next, the court addressed whether the Gambling Act discriminated 
against interstate commerce in its practical effect.152 Although Rousso 
argued that discrimination could be found in the economic protectionism 
at work behind the Act, the court rejected this argument as both miscon-
struing and misapplying the legal standard.153 To Rousso, the Act affect-
ed interstate commerce by walling off the Washington market from the 
Internet gambling market to preserve the state’s local gambling opera-
tions.154 But the relevant inquiry, the court claimed, was “how the effects 
of the [Gambling Act] are imposed on in-state and out-of-state entities, 
not what the effect is on those entities’ revenue.”155 Furthermore, an in-
crease in business for Washington’s in-state gambling businesses was 
merely a secondary effect of the Gambling Act, not a direct effect.156 
Moreover, the court distinguished Internet gambling and brick-and-
mortar gambling as two different activities that presented different risks 
and concerns, and thus created different regulatory challenges.157 In light 
of these differences, the state did not need to regulate Internet gambling 
and brick-and-mortar gambling in the same manner.158 
While the court found no economic protectionism at work in the 
Act, it nonetheless recognized that the Act imposed a burden on inter-
state commerce by “walling off the Washington market for Internet gam-
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bling.”159 Yet to the court, two facts mitigated the extent of this burden. 
First, the Act did not prevent or hinder Internet gambling business from 
operating outside the state.160 And second, Internet gambling business 
could “easily exclude Washingtonians.”161 Such exclusion, the court rea-
soned, could be achieved if Internet gambling businesses required a user 
to identify his or her location before placing a bet online.162 In sum, the 
court concluded that the Act’s burden on interstate commerce equated to 
but did not outweigh the substantial state interest stemming from the 
state’s police power to protect the health, welfare, safety, and morals of 
its citizens.163 
Lastly, the court found that Washington could not achieve its inter-
est in protecting the health, safety, and morals of its citizens through a 
means less restrictive than the Gambling Act. Although Rousso argued 
that the state could have accomplished its interest in a manner less re-
strictive than an outright ban on Internet gambling,164 the court refrained 
from second-guessing legislative policies in such a manner. To the court, 
it was unclear whether a less restrictive regulation could address the so-
cial harms of Internet gambling as effectively as a complete ban.165 In 
addition, even if such a less restrictive regulation was possible, it was not 
clear that such a regulation would decrease the burden on interstate 
commerce.166 
Having concluded that the Act did not impose excessive burdens on 
interstate commerce and that the state could not regulate Internet gam-
bling as effectively with a less restrictive means, the supreme court held 
that Washington’s Gambling Act did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.167 
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V. CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 
The decision set forth by the Washington State Supreme Court suf-
fers from three significant flaws. First, the Washington State Supreme 
Court did not identify or otherwise articulate that the inconsistent regula-
tions test and extraterritoriality analysis were facets of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Yet as the court of appeals noted, the supreme court’s 
earlier decision in Heckel makes clear that the supreme court has adopted 
these tests for purposes of assessing state laws affecting the Internet.168 
While it is possible that the supreme court may have collapsed these tests 
into its general discussion of the burdens imposed by the Gambling Act, 
the opinion does not hint that such a synthesis actually occurred. Instead, 
the court’s failure to specifically identify these tests suggests that it 
strayed from its own precedent and turned instead to a less rigorous 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 
It may be that the Washington State Supreme Court simply failed to 
consider inconsistencies and extraterritorialities for a practical reason: 
because federal law indirectly prohibits Internet gambling businesses 
from operating in the United States, all Internet gambling businesses op-
erate in foreign jurisdictions.169 Thus, because there are currently no In-
ternet gambling businesses operating in the United States, there is little 
risk that the state’s Gambling Act will render inconsistent outcomes or 
impose costs of compliance beyond the state’s borders. But in light of the 
recent attempts by other states to legalize Internet gambling, it may be 
necessary, if not crucial, for future courts to assess these factors. For ex-
ample, because Washington’s law applies to the receipt of gambling in-
formation by Internet gambling websites,170 it could be possible that if 
New Jersey legalized Internet gambling, Washington’s criminal penalties 
would apply to those New Jersey businesses that were operating lawfully 
in that state.171 But under the Washington State Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, there is no articulated basis for future courts to consider whether 
such an outcome is a burden by virtue of the inconsistencies imposed. 
Yet the Washington Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that 
courts must apply the inconsistent regulations and extraterritorialities 
tests in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.172 Adopting the reasoning 
of the court of appeals would provide future courts with a more struc-
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tured basis for resolving potential conflicts among state Internet gam-
bling laws. 
Second, the Washington State Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
Gambling Act did not “prevent or hinder” Internet gambling businesses 
from operating outside the state was overbroad. As the court of appeals 
recognized, the Gambling Act does hinder such businesses from operat-
ing insofar as Washington attaches criminal penalties for knowing viola-
tions of the Act.173 The supreme court, however, confined its analysis to 
considering the extent to which “walling off the Washington market” 
was a burden on interstate commerce.174 The court’s failure to recognize 
this potential externality suggests that it did not rigorously consider the 
extent to which Washington’s Gambling Act might impose costs beyond 
the state’s borders. The court of appeals, however, specifically acknowl-
edged as problematic the fact that the Act exported criminal penalties to 
passive websites that operated far outside of Washington’s borders.175 
The appellate court’s treatment of this factor shows that, although a law’s 
exportation of criminal liability is a burden courts must consider in a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the existence of such criminal lia-
bility can also be mitigated by other factors, such as the relative ease of 
compliance.176 
Third, the supreme court’s method of measuring how the burdens 
imposed by the Act could be mitigated rests on shaky grounds. To the 
supreme court, the burdens imposed by the Gambling Act were not ex-
cessive because Internet gambling businesses could “easily” comply with 
the state’s ban by requesting age verification before permitting users to 
gamble.177 While this may be true, the supreme court overlooks the 
anonymous nature of Internet use. Because the Internet can be used 
anonymously, individuals—including children—could lie about their 
ages to bypass such verifications,178 and it is thus unclear whether a web-
site that relies solely on self-reported age verifications could be said to 
knowingly violate the Gambling Act and thus be subject to criminal pen-
alties. 
Instead, the court of appeals’ rationale that Internet websites could 
determine user location based on IP addresses provides a more useful 
basis for measuring the burden imposed by the Act. Such measures 
would permit Internet gambling businesses to exclude users based on the 
                                                 
 173. Id. 
 174. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1091-92 (Wash. 2010). 
 175. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240. 
 176. Rousso, 204 P.3d at 251. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra Part II.A. 
1572 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1549 
state of origin,179 which in turn could prevent such businesses from be-
coming unknowing recipients of unlawful transmissions of gambling 
information from those states. Although the court vaguely cited the “rela-
tively small cost” of adopting such a measure,180 its proposition that In-
ternet businesses can exclude users based on IP address provides a more 
accurate and concrete example for future courts to follow when measur-
ing the cost of compliance with similar state Internet gambling acts. 
Although both courts ultimately concluded that Washington’s In-
ternet gambling statute survives a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, 
the means by which they arrived at their conclusions differ greatly. 
Whereas the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision suffers from 
several flaws, the decision of the court of appeals rests squarely on prec-
edent and provides a more concrete basis for future courts to measure 
state Internet gambling laws. Thus, future courts should adopt the ra-
tionale of the court of appeals in Rousso when analyzing the constitu-
tionality of a state Internet gambling regulation under the dormant Com-
merce Clause. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current political pressure for states to pass laws legalizing Internet 
gambling181 makes it all too likely that other state courts will soon face 
constitutional challenges similar to that in Rousso. Although the dormant 
Commerce Clause is not a novel doctrine, courts faced with such chal-
lenges will almost inevitably look to Rousso as persuasive precedent on 
how to apply this doctrine to a state Internet gambling law. Those courts, 
however, should not look to the Washington State Supreme Court’s opin-
ion for such guidance; instead, courts should adopt the reasoning set 
forth by the Washington Court of Appeals. 
As the decisions in Rousso show, the dormant Commerce Clause is 
an appropriate vehicle for assessing the constitutionality of state Internet 
gambling laws. Applying a rule that prohibits any state regulation affect-
ing the Internet is likely overbroad, which is illustrated by both Washing-
ton courts’ rejections of the American Libraries decision. Moreover, 
such a rule is not faithful to the current statutory scheme: both the Wire 
Act and the UIGEA envision that states will regulate gambling to some 
degree.182 
Ultimately, the decision of the court of appeals provides a more 
rigorous application of the dormant Commerce Clause for future courts 
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to look to. Most significantly, the court of appeals, unlike the supreme 
court, recognized that state Internet gambling laws implicate the potential 
for inconsistencies among the states and costs imposed beyond state bor-
ders, both of which are proper components of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.183 In light of the “jurisdictional uniqueness” of the Internet,184 the 
appellate court’s decision provides a clearer and more rigorous standard 
that courts should look to when applying the dormant Commerce Clause 
to similar laws. 
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